New photos just released by the National Transportation Safety Board show the rapid and dramatic loss of an engine on UPS cargo plane in November, and provide important insight into factors contributing to the deadly crash.
The series of six images, taken from an airport surveillance video shows the engine and the pylon attaching it to the left wing breaking away from the MD-11 widebody just as the airplane is rotating on takeoff from Louisville Muhammad Ali International Airport. Fuel ignited on both the engine and wing tank. And in the 4th photo in the series, the engine flies over the fuselage. It was found later on the runway.
Fourteen people were killed and millions of dollars in damage done as the plane, having attained only 30 feet of altitude, plowed into industrial buildings just beyond the airport perimeter.
Now, investigators are concerned that the loss of the engine may have been the most serious in a series of failures of small but critical parts of the assembly that keeps the engine attached to the plane.
The photo above, released by the NTSB shows cracking of the round lugs holding the pylon to the wing. But going deeper into the innards, the investigators discovered that a “spherical bearing race” had completely ruptured. That could have been the initiating event.
The NTSB reported that Boeing first became aware of complaints with these parts 15 years ago. The company learned of four instances on three separate airplanes involving the “race” a thinner channel in the metal cylinder where the bearing is contained. This difference in thickness could cause the cylinder to split. Even so, Boeing concluded “it would not result in a safety of flight condition,” according to the NTSB. So unconcerned was Boeing about the channel causing a failure of the cylinder that, though a replacement to the original part without the recessed track was available, its use was not required. Visually inspecting this part on the MD-11 every 60 months was sufficient.
I have not been able to find any details on the previous problems with the spherical bearing race of which Boeing was reportedly aware. The one accident cited in Wednesday’s preliminary report as a “similar crash” is American Airlines Flight 191 in 1979, but it is not part of the four. It is similar only in that the DC-10 lost an engine on takeoff and flew into the ground. It is unrelated in that the engine separation was related to maintenance practices of the airline, not design practices of the manufacturer. And in fact, the DC-10 wasn’t Boeing’s problem back then as McDonnell Douglas was still in business.
The NTSB’s photo of the spherical bearing race from the Louisville crash shows a relatively small part with a frighteningly advanced problem. Color coding indicates that fatigue cracking was substantial.
Armchair investigators and pilots familiar with large multi-engine airplanes have not been sparing with their opinions about why, with two remaining engines, the UPS crew was unable to continue to ascend. In the update, the official investigators seem to be asking the same question while promising that analysing aircraft performance is on their list of things to do.
We have a saying in aviation: the FAR’s (now CFR’s) are written in blood. It’s actually quite disgusting when I think about it. Nothing gets fixed until people die. Refer to the 737MAX accident causation.
My career in aviation maintenance and engineering spanned almost 50 years with years of experience at a major airline and at Boeing where I retired from. My son, who’s an FO for a major airline asked me how Boeing could have listed this critical issue as “would not result in a safety of flight condition “?
My answer to him was this, because of incompetent engineering and incompetent engineering managers – fleet chief, who bought off on this service LETTER and incompetence at the FAA for once again lack of technical oversight.
With the history of AA191 and 4 other incident findings this should have been an alert service bulletin – then an AD! The airline operators maintenance programs are managed with this information from the OEM’s. But they do have the authority to go less on inspection criteria they obviously did not.
It’s a damn shame that this accident even happened with all the risk mitigation measures and SMS systems available today.. ruined lives and families deeply impacted.
This accident has the same haunting of Alaska F261 with the catastrophic premature wear on the critical H/stab ball nut.
It’s hard to close the holes in the Swiss cheese when someone keeps making new holes.
Boeing Service Letter MD-11-SL-54-104-A, dated February 7, 2011
The design of the accident airplane’s aft mount bulkhead spherical bearing assembly appears consistent with the design of the unmodified part number (P/N) S00399-1, which was the subject of a Boeing Service Letter regarding previous spherical bearing race failures.
Did UPS ever find any of the installed spherical bearing assemblies to be unserviceable?
Question is, did UPS ever replace any of N259UP forward or aft mount bulkhead spherical bearing assemblies?
And if so, why didn’t UPS replace any of the forward or aft mount bulkhead spherical bearing assemblies with the new and recommended Boeing forward or aft mount bulkhead spherical bearing assembly in the Service Letter discussed with the new configuration spherical bearing assembly, P/N S00399-523?
ANSWER: UPS “ALWAYS” puts profits ahead of safety and it was cheaper to use older parts in-stock or scrapped parts from airplanes put in storage at the DM AFB Bone Yard in Tucson, AZ.
Boeing Service Letter MD-11-SL-54-104-A, dated February 7, 2011:
The Service Letter stated that, for Boeing MD-11 airplanes, inspection of the spherical bearing assembly would be included in the general visual inspection (GVI) and detailed visual inspection of the pylon aft mount, normally at a repetitive 60-month interval (5 years).
Question is, when was UPS’ last inspection of the spherical bearing assembly that should be included in the general visual inspection (GVI) and detailed visual inspection of the pylon aft mount, normally at a repetitive 60-month interval?
Additionally, investigators are reviewing UPS’s incorporation of the contents of the Service Letter into its Boeing MD-11 maintenance program…..
Question is, was the Boeing Service Letter mandatory like an Airworthiness Directive (AD), if not did UPS comply with the 2011 Boeing Service Letter? If not, why not?
….as well as the correspondence history between Boeing and the FAA leading up to issuance of the Service Letter and thereafter.
What communication did Boeing have with the FAA? And what communication did the FAA have with the FAA Certificate Management Offices (CMOs) for all MD11 operators throughout the Country???
Specifically what enforcement action did the FAA UPS CMO in Louisville, KY have regarding UPs’ compliance with the Boeing Service Letter MD-11-SL-54-104-A, dated February 7, 2011??
Dollars to doughnuts, the FAA UPS CMO had ZERO enforcement action for UPS to comply with the Boeing Service Letter MD-11-SL-54-104-A, dated February 7, 2011.
Let’s see if UPS tries to cover up the CVR from the MD-11 tragedy. If the CVR has info on it that would affect current safety issues; would that info be passed on to the FAA and more importantly to UPS pilots? UPS most likely has the conversation between Captain Dana Diamond and Chief Pilot A A that took place before that tragic flight. Would that be released or destroyed? The FAA has already allowed UPS’ 2 hour delay of that flight to go unexplained. Why?
Look up Brown v . Nolen. CVR was not preserved. UPS pilots lied about another pilot and that pilot’s ATP was pulled based off those lies. Gerald Brown demanded the CVR be pulled to proove his innocence. Brown knew he would absolutely be terminated if CVR prooved he was lying and that he was hostile. He DEMANDED it because he knew the other pilots were lying. HIMS is weaponized. UPS submitted false statements to at least 2 FAA HIMS AMEs. Captain Douglas Greene provided cockpit recording to FAA proving a pilot lied about him and that evidence was ignored and Greene was fired because he addressed fatigue issues at UPS. The recording may have been against FARs but it preserved the truth. That UPS submitted false statements to FAA HIMS AMEs.
See former UPS MD11 Captain Greene, June 2025 REDACTED interview sounding the warning ⛔️ horn of UPS dysfunctional corporate culture and the likelihood they would lose another airplane, and here we are, yet again, but no one listened:
https://youtu.be/mDQx75Z7510?feature=shared
The system (FAA, DOL, DOT, DOJ, etc.) is the problem & the enemy of the people, they no longer care about safety and loss of life is now simply their cost of doing business.