PART ONE
As more information emerges from the potential collision of the President’s military helicopter with a commercial airliner in Washington Wednesday, this is worth noting. It is the fourth investigation launched in less than two years by the National Transportation Safety Board in which military operations created hazards for commercial flights. In 2 of the 3 events where a probable loss of separation between military aircraft and commercial flights was the issue, the worst did not happen. Having the Presidential helicopter in the latest episode certainly ratchets up the visibility of the problem. I’ll be writing about the latest event today, and the others in a future post.
Shortly after lunchtime on Wednesday, President Trump boarded Marine One, for a short trip to Andrews Air Force Base. The pilot radioed air traffic controllers with the message that the aircraft would be lifting off in 3 minutes. Air traffic at the very busy Ronald Reagan Washington National Airport is halted when the president is being transported by air in the DC area. Why flights continued to take off, doesn’t seem like a big mystery. The air traffic controller did not hear the Marine pilot’s calls and could not pass it along to the controller handling the airlines flight.
In the radio exchange audible in the link below, Marine One transmitted multiple times, an intention to takeoff in three minutes. But the aircraft departed without receiving confirmation that the messages were received. By the time the controller understood the helicopter was enroute, his concern was evident. He warned Marine One of a departing flight, “rotating off runway one, E170.” This would be a 68 seat Embraer 170 regional jet taking off, operating for American Airlines. Twice, Marine One acknowledged the information. But did the military pilots see the plane?
Cassandra Nolan, a spokeswoman for the Federal Aviation Administration told The New York Times, there was a “momentary loss of separation” as the airliner and the helicopter came closer than 1.5 miles horizontally and 500 feet vertically. Nolan insists the President was never in danger.
Not everyone is going to believe that because no one on either aircraft was harmed, there was no danger. A loss of separation between two aircraft is dangerous. That’s why separation rules exist.
Ben Lochary, a retired airline captain whose new book, Aviation Safety A Capital Disaster was recently published, has flown into DCA hundreds of times. He writes about the mind-boggling number of work-arounds at the airport. They were put in place over the course of years, not to improve safety but to accommodate the limits-pushing exceptions. These have allowed the main runway at an “antiquated airport” to become the busiest commercial runway in the country and often, a scary place to fly in and out of.
Over at the NTSB, where a few lucky employees with south facing windows in their offices can actually see the action at the Capitol’s in-town airport, Jennifer Homendy has been beating her head against the wall over its deplorable state of safety. In February she told US Senators the shortcomings exposed by the 2025 collision of an Army helicopter with the American jetliner that killed everyone aboard both aircraft. She said reliance on pilots to see and avoid other aircraft was flawed for many reasons.
In the case of Flight 5342 and the Army Blackhawk helicopter, she recalled that “despite the ambiguous visual scene at the time, the (Army instructor pilot) responded almost immediately that he had the traffic (Flight 5342) in sight.” That was doubtful. The speed of his reply suggested “a rote response that occurred without positively identifying Flight 5342.”
Listen again to Marine One’s response to ATC’s comment about the Embraer on takeoff about 1:20 in. Does that sound like what Homendy is talking about?
Just 10 days ago, Homendy was once again urging action on the many safety recommendations made by the board to prevent similar disasters.
“We are no closer today to addressing many of the serious safety gaps that contributed to this terrible tragedy,” she said as she pleaded for action. Every day that passes is a “unacceptable risk to public safety,” she said. One might have thought it hyperbolic to suggest its a threat to the president, too. Not anymore.
The Department of Defense is good at bombing & strafing, but it’s not much good as an airline. It doesn’t have the equipment of the civilian sector and often its pilots don’t have the training needed for crowded civilian environments.
Yes, they can co-exist safely.
In human factors, we learn about effective communication. What is effective communication? This is when feedback on a transmitted message has been received. The originator transmits, the receiver receives and understands, and then provides feedback to the originator, who must also understand the response.
In this case, ATC did not receive the message from Marine One and could not provide feedback to the pilot. Without feedback, the Marine One pilot should not have commenced the flight.
Click on the link below to read about effective communication.
Great article, Christine. The frenzied pace at DCA demands the highest professionalism by all. So much so that it may exceed human capacity. I don’t think the mix of civilian and military traffic is the problem, it is more a problem of saturation. AI may provide a solution with its instant recognition of potential conflicts.
In this case, multiple participants were trying to communicate simultaneously. When that happens, we call it being “stepped on”. Until clear communication is established, those who can hold their position should. In the helicopter’s case, they were given notification of potentially conflicting traffic. If they see it, they respond “in sight.” If they do not respond, or do not say that, the controller knows they either do not see it, or did not hear the transmission. Likewise, when the helicopter broadcast their intent to depart and did not receive an acknowledgement, they know the controller either did not hear them, or doesn’t yet have time to respond.
The wrong approach will be to determine who is at fault. In an attempt to see that it doesn’t happen again, that solves nothing. Human factors are where we should look. How can the system be changed to allow for the inevitable human frailities. We have hit human limits, so only system changes, and perhaps AI, can solve this.
I recall when Henson Airlines acquired the Dash 7. Its STOL capabilities allowed it to land and hold short of DCA’s main runway. As result they were awarded extra slots. Never mind the fact that this end run around slot control increased traffic congestion for the airport …..Ben’s book does a great job putting into perspective just how far bureaucratic self interest has compromised safety at DCA
“The aircraft departed without receiving confirmation that the messages were received.”
Bingo.